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ABSTRACT One determining characteristic of contemporary sociopolitical systems is their
power over increasingly large and diverse populations. This raises questions about power
relations between heterogeneous individuals and increasingly dominant and homogenizing
system objectives. This article crosses epistemic boundaries by integrating computer engi-
neering and a historicalphilosophical approach making the general organization of individuals
within large-scale systems and corresponding individual homogenization intelligible. From a
versatile archeological-genealogical perspective, an analysis of computer and social archi-
tectures is conducted that reinterprets Foucault’s disciplines and political anatomy to establish
the notion of politics for a purely technical system. This permits an understanding of system
organization as modern technology with application to technical and social systems alike.
Connecting to Heidegger’s notions of the enframing (Gestell) and a more primal truth
(anfänglicheren Wahrheit), the recognition of politics in differently developing systems then
challenges the immutability of contemporary organization. Following this critique of mod-
ernity and within the conceptualization of system organization, Derrida’s democracy to come
(à venir) is then reformulated more abstractly as organizations to come. Through the inte-
gration of the discussed concepts, the framework of Large-Scale Systems Composed of
Homogeneous Individuals (LSSCHI) is proposed, problematizing the relationships between
individuals, structure, activity, and power within large-scale systems. The LSSCHI framework
highlights the conflict of homogenizing system-level objectives and individual heterogeneity,
and outlines power relations and mechanisms of control shared across different social and
technical systems.
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Introduction
As a set of norms and perspectives, the way of interpreting,perceiving, and relating to the world, adhering to theprinciples of Enlightenment and Encyclopedia, modernity
shaped western societies, including the conceptualizations of
technologies that influence our lives. This historical, sociopolitical
project sought to order, classify and measure the universe, to
control and to standardize it, with disciplined bodies and uniform
individuals being an essential part of this vision. As Foucault
noted: “modern thought is advancing towards that region where
man’s Other must become the Same as himself” (Foucault, 2005,
p. 358). Against this background, the reactions of western
societies to recently intensifying migration across the world might
therefore not be surprising. The USA betrays its proclaimed
principle of liberty and its image as the land of opportunities by
incarcerating migrants, most despicably, children (Long, 2019).
Similarly, the EU outsources border control and tries to curb
migration by financially supporting the Lybian coast guard,
returning migrants to violent detention camps in a country torn
by an intensifying civil war (Sunderland and Salah, 2019). Many
authors problematized the project of modernity. While they are
not necessarily entirely against it, they denounced the obscure,
the hidden, and unacceptable aspects of it. Nietzsche, among
others, criticized the notion of a unique and unified “truth”, the
primacy of rationality, and order that are so fundamental to
modernity. In his critique of metaphysics of presence, Heidegger
protested “an objectivistic understanding of a world composed of
law-governed things subject to theoretical representation and
technical manipulation” (Feenberg, 2018, p. 131). Following this
epistemological tradition, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida
were two of the most avid critics of modernity (Clifford, 1987, p.
223) and also exhibit significant similarities in their political
thought regarding the need for pluralism (Bennington, 2016, pp.
3–7). Foucault advanced our understanding of contemporary
social organization as modern technology, essential to the exercise
of political power such as in Bentham’s Panopticon. Modern
technologies of power also mark the increasing interpretation of
politics as policy, where politics is reduced to the administration
and organization of people—a common point of criticism in
Derrida’s work.
Modern technologies have played a particularly central role in
the advancement and implementation of the principles of mod-
ernity, including its instrumentalization for exercising political
power. Among various others, Langdon Winner (1980) showed
that political ideology is embedded in technological artifacts. He
convincingly argued that technology enforces politics among
humans as a result of their interaction with socio-technical sys-
tems. Politics emerge as a necessary element as system-level
objectives might not be collectively agreed upon and have to be
achieved through some kind of coercion (i.e., economic depen-
dence and enforcement of state power). A collection of essays by
Andrew Feenberg, providing a range of additional perspectives on
the intricate relations of “technology, modernity, and democracy”
can be found in Beira and Feenberg (2018). In this work, we
explore the interdependence of sociopolitical ideas and techno-
logical design for one of the most defining modern technologies,
the digital computer. The first digital, general-purpose computer,
the ENIAC, was designed to calculate ballistic missile trajectories
for the US Army during World War II (McCartney, 1999). As
McCartney argues, while primitive in comparison to today’s
computers, it laid a foundation that influenced computer archi-
tectures1 for decades. This suggests that military interests and
applications, with significant social and political ramifications,
have had an impact on computer design. As argued by Tedre
et al. (2006), computer science is locked up in northwestern
cultures reinforcing the prevailing binary logic system employed
in the design of computer applications. While this binary logic is
but one representation through which we can engage with the
world, since it is the dominant representation, it eliminates a vast
amount of knowledge systems and creativity from other cultures
in the shaping of our societies (Eglash, 1999; Eglash, 2007). In
other words, we can consider the digital computer as a mani-
festation, not just of a powerful and important technology, but of
modern thought itself.
This relation of technology and modernity becomes especially
relevant in reflecting on Heidegger’s concept of the enframing
(Gestell) of modern technology (Heidegger, 1981, p. 20). We
understand the enframing as a set of constraints (conscious or
unconscious) that determine the technological design decisions
we perceive as viable. By reflecting on the value-laden political
dimension of technology (Winner, 1980), as well as the dom-
inance of a specific culture over others (Eglash, 1999), we can
then take seriously Heidegger’s concern that the danger of
modern technology lies in the exclusion of alternative forms of
being and human-technology relations. To establish an episte-
mological link between social systems and computer archi-
tectures, we based this research on the theoretical and
methodological framework proposed by Foucault mainly in Dis-
cipline & Punish (1977). The concepts of the disciplines and
political anatomy (Foucault, 1977, pp. 137–8) outline how mod-
ern political technologies of surveillance, normalization, and
synchronization are used to arrange individuals as to function
within a large system. Under notions of efficiency and utility,
individuals become subject to homogenization, which results in a
change in power relations between individuals and the system. As
Foucault noted, the Panopticon, as one such example, is a
metaphor of the disciplinary power, a materialization of the
capitalist discipline, an architectural figure of comprehending the
reality (Foucault, 1977, p. 200). “The Panopticon […] must be
understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of
defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 205). With a genealogical approach, this article
reinterprets Foucault’s concepts by applying them to computer
architecture, demonstrating that politics can reside in social and
technical systems and that the defining features of political
organization might not necessarily be found only in the social
realm. Through an archeological exploration of computer archi-
tecture, which is strongly determined by modern thought, it is
argued that by understanding different social and technical sys-
tems as manifestations of a more abstract system class, we can
potentially identify power relations and mechanisms of control
inherent to the more abstract system class itself (as a specific
modern enframing). In Heidegger’s interpretation, it might allow
us to identify an essence that shaped the abstract system class.
This excavation of the organizing principles of computer archi-
tecture and its similarities to social organization, are then
advanced through Derrida. The democracy to come (à venir) is a
problematization of modern sociopolitical organization and
institutions and demands ideas about potential alternatives. These
are not clearly defined, but are argued to not be achieved through
the modern approach of extensive quantification, homogeniza-
tion, and engineering of the social through the reduction of
politics to policies.
Within this work we pursue two objectives. First, we want to
broaden our understanding of politics from social and socio-
technical systems to purely technical systems themselves. This
will open up reflections on the design of technical artifacts in
general and computer architecture in particular and can help
reveal an enframing influential in engineering practices and
conceptualizations. And second, we aim to generalize from the
observation of two distinct systems, one social, one technical, to a
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more abstract notion of system organization, the roles and
activities of individuals, and individual and system-level func-
tionality. In other words, we intend to arrive at an essential
relation of the enframing that governs social organization and
computer architecture. In summary, this paper follows an epis-
temological tradition to rethink the mechanisms of power (in
technical or social systems) that subject individuals to con-
temporary levels of functional reduction and homogenization. It
aims to open up reflections on alternative forms of organizations,
organizations that embrace plurality, and posits that by rethink-
ing technology (as artifact or as method), we are also rethinking
the essence of modern organization more generally.
Foucault and computer architecture
In this section, we reinterpret parts of Discipline & Punish
(Foucault, 1977) to establish a philosophical narrative about
computer architecture and a notion of politics for this technical
system. With only a few changes (in italics) to the original
vocabulary (see Table 1), the following analogies are intended to
support a different imagination of computer architecture and to
establish significant similarities in the organization of two distinct
systems that both rely on principles of modernity. However, first
we need to justify the reinterpretations and explain why they are
more than superficial analogies, simply retelling an existing story
in a different context.
First, the most fundamental reinterpretation was made from
individual/body to transistor. Generally speaking, any given sys-
tem is either composed of homogenous or heterogenous com-
ponents. That is, either a system consists of components of only a
single class, or of components from across many classes. In
heterogeneous systems, components can be said to have their
functionality inscribed in them (e.g., due to a specific form or
other property), and hence their position within the system is
predetermined and not simply replaceable by any other arbitrary
component. Contrary, and as we will discuss in detail throughout
this work, the assumption in homogeneous systems is that all
components are (to a degree) identical. The implication is that
individuals are generic and replaceable, and their precise function
is determined by the location and sequence they are embedded in.
In that sense, the analogies between social systems and computer
architecture are much more adequate as compared to the vast
majority of other technical systems composed of heterogeneous
components.
A second argument motivating the reinterpretations concerns
the inception of the normalization of individuals (the elimination
or marginalization of differences across (almost) homogeneous
individuals). Humans are born into social systems with their
“imperfections” and are successively normalized over time.
Contrary, transistors are specified and homogenized prior to their
integration into computer architecture. This difference informs
the reinterpretations of surveillance and tactics. Surveillance in
social systems carries the expectation that non-sanctioned beha-
vior will need to be corrected. With transistors being fully
homogenized prior to system integration, any non-sanctioned
behavior is eliminated by default and the notion of control suf-
fices to operate the system. Similarly, the expectation of the
unexpected behavior then requires tactics to deal with them, while
in the absence of the unexpected design suffices to define all
behavior from the start. The remaining reinterpretations
(mechanical-digital, movements-activity, labor-computation,
profit-information) simply reflect the context of the computer as
a digital technology.
The concepts and techniques that led to the architecture of the
first microcontrollers did not redefine or reinvent basic principles
of computation, such as Boolean logic. “However, there were
several new things in these techniques. To begin with, there was
the scale of the control: it was a question not of treating tran-
sistors2, en masse, “wholesale”, as if it were an indissociable unity,
but of working it “retail”, individually; of exercising upon it a
subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the
mechanism itself—activity, stable states, energy, frequency3: an
infinitesimal power over the active transistor. Then there was the
object of the control: it was not or was no longer the signifying
elements of function or the properties of the transistor, but the
economy, the efficiency of switching, their internal organization;
constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the states; the
only truly important act is that of switching. Lastly, there is the
modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, con-
trolling4 the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is
exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as
possible time, space, activity. These methods, which made pos-
sible the meticulous control of the operations of the transistor,
which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed
upon them a relation of docility, might be called “disciplines””
(Foucault, 1977, pp. 136–137).
Based on the definition of the disciplines that individual tran-
sistors are subjected to, Foucault continues to describe the poli-
tical and economic reasoning behind individualized subjection.
“What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act
upon the transistor, a calculated manipulation of its electrons, its
states, its switching. The transistor was entering a machinery of
power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A poli-
tical anatomy, which was also a “mechanics of power”, was being
born; it defined how one may have a hold over many transistors,
not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they
may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the
efficiency that one determines. Thus, discipline produces sub-
jected and practised transistors, “docile”5 transistors. Discipline
increases the forces of the transistor (in economic terms of utility)
and diminishes these same forces (in technical terms of reduced
variation6). In short, it dissociates power from the transistor; on
the one hand, it turns it into an “aptitude”, a “capacity”, which it
seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the
energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a
relation of strict subjection. If economic exploitation separates the
force and the product of labor, let us say that disciplinary coer-
cion establishes in the transistor the constricting link between an
increased aptitude and an increased domination” (Foucault, 1977,
p. 138).
Computer architecture, or the arrangement of initially a few
thousand, then millions, nowadays billions of transistors, had to
develop methods to efficiently integrate these transistors into a
single system. “It does this first of all on the principle of ele-
mentary location or partitioning. Each transistor has his own
place; and each place its transistor. Avoid distributions in groups;
break up collective dispositions; analyze confused, massive or
transient pluralities. Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as
Table 1 Main reinterpretations from Foucault to computer
architecture.
Foucault Computer architecture
Individual/body Transistor
Supervision Control
Tactics Design
Mechanical Digital
Movements/gestures Activity/switching
Labor Computation
Profit Information
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many sections as there are transistors or elements to be dis-
tributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distribu-
tions, the uncontrolled disengagement of individuals, their diffuse
connections, their unusable and uncontrollable coagulation; it was
a design7 of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration.
Its aim was to establish conductance’s and resistances, to know
where and how to locate transistors, to set up useful commu-
nications, to avoid others, to be able at each moment to control
the conduct of each transistor, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate
its qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at
knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organizes an analytical
space” (Foucault, 1977, p. 143).
The precise spatial definition of computer architectures was the
foundation for the implementation of temporal methods of
control and processing. “By creating a central clock8 it was pos-
sible to carry out a control that was both general and individual:
to observe the transistor’s presence and application, and the states
of their work; to compare transistors with one another, to classify
them according to characteristics and speed; to follow the suc-
cessive stages of processing9. All these serializations formed a
permanent grid: confusion was eliminated: that is to say, pro-
cessing was divided up and the computation process was articu-
lated, on the one hand, according to its stages or elementary
operations, and, on the other hand, according to the individuals,
the particular transistors, that carried it out: each variable of this
force—energy, speed, accuracy—would be observed, and therefore
characterized, assessed, computed, and related to the individual
who was its particular agent. Thus, spread out in a perfectly
legible way over the whole series of individual transistors, the
processing force may be analyzed in individual units. At the
emergence of large-scale computation, one finds, beneath the
division of the processing, the individualizing fragmentation of
computational power; the distributions of the disciplinary space
often assured both” (Foucault, 1977, p. 145). The reinterpretation
of this paragraph has to be taken with a grain of salt as transistors
are not observed, compared and classified in the literal sense (see
argument of inception of homogenization at the beginning of the
section). Interestingly, various science fiction narratives (e.g.,
Gattaca, Blade Runner, The Stepford Wives) portray the idea of
observing, comparing, and classifying humans prior to their
conception, thus blurring the lines between social systems and
deterministic machines. An idea that was already pursued by the
Lebensborn program of the German National Socialist regime
aiming to ensure the reproduction of racially pure, thus homo-
genized individuals.
With the shift from designing computers for specific applications
to a “general purpose architecture” computation redefined the
relation to time, which was now made manageable through the
disciplines. “Discipline […] arranges a positive economy; it poses
the principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion
rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more
available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful for-
ces. This means that one must seek to intensify the use of the
slightest moment, as if time, in its very fragmentation, were inex-
haustible or as if, at least by an ever more detailed internal
arrangement, one could tend towards an ideal point at which one
maintained maximum speed and maximum efficiency. […] The
more time is broken down, the more its subdivisions multiply, the
better one disarticulates it by deploying its internal elements under
a gaze that controls them, the more one can accelerate an operation,
or at least regulate it according to an optimum speed; hence this
regulation of the time of an action that was so important in the
army and which was to be so throughout the entire technology of
computational activity” (Foucault, 1977, p. 154).
In its fundamental operation computer architecture relies on
fully fragmented individual control and exhaustion of time. The
relation between the individual transistor and the computer as a
whole is defined through these methods. “The “seriation” of
successive tasksmakes possible a whole investment of duration by
power: the possibility of a detailed control and a regular inter-
vention (of differentiation, correction, elimination) in each
moment of time; the possibility of characterizing, and therefore of
using individual transistors according to the level in the series that
they are embedded in; the possibility of accumulating time and
activity, of rediscovering them, totalized and usable in a final
result, which is the ultimate capacity of a transistor. Temporal
dispersal is brought together to produce information10, thus
mastering a duration that would otherwise elude one’s grasp.
Power is articulated directly onto time; it assures its control and
guarantees its use” (Foucault, 1977, p. 160). Computation in this
sense is therefore “that technique by which one imposes on the
transistor tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always
graduated. By bending behavior towards terminal states, compu-
tation makes possible a perpetual characterization of the tran-
sistor either in relation to this term, in relation to other
transistors, or in relation to a type of process. It thus assures, in
the form of continuity and constraint, a growth, an observation, a
qualification” (Foucault, 1977, p. 160).
We can find further motivations for specific design choices
applicable to large-scale computer architecture. “Thus a new
demand appears to which discipline must respond: to construct a
machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articu-
lation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is
no longer simply an art of distributing transistors, of extracting time
from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to
obtain an efficient machine. This demand is expressed in several
ways” (Foucault, 1977, p. 164). One such way is the operation of a
transistor as a binary device that will only know two valid states.
“This is a functional reduction of the transistor. However, it is also
an insertion of this transistor-segment in a whole ensemble over
which it is articulated. The transistor whose physics have been
optimized to function part by part for particular operations must in
turn form an element in a mechanism at another level” (Foucault,
1977, p. 164). This statement better demonstrates the use of docility
in connection with transistors, where docility is inextricably tied to
functional reduction and system integration. In addition to the
functional reduction of the individual transistor, how that transistor
interacts must be specified. “The various chronological series that
discipline must combine to form a composite time are also pieces of
machinery. The cycle11 of each must be adjusted to the cycle of the
others in such a way that the maximum quantity of forces may be
extracted from each and combined with the optimum result”
(Foucault, 1977, pp. 164–165).
This adaptation of Foucault demonstrates how computer
architecture follows very similar organizing principles as modern
social systems. We initially defined the disciplines and political
anatomy of computer architecture, followed by descriptions of
spatial and temporal control. Integrated into a “mechanics of
power”, these methods of control define the relations between
individual transistors, their activity, and the collective function-
ality. This technology is so powerful that it has reshaped our lives
like few technologies before, and what enabled the vast system-
level functional diversity of its applications is the extreme func-
tional reduction of and full control over the individual transistors.
We could therefore count the computer architecture as additional
empirical evidence for Winner’s question about the organization
of large technical systems (Winner, 1980).
Additional engineering perspectives
We will now take the main arguments from the previous section
and provide a more mainstream engineering perspective that
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incorporates some of the implications and limitations of certain
computer engineering choices. In our adaptation of Foucault, we
pointed to three main elements of what he described as the dis-
ciplines. First, control was not exercised on groups, leaving some
level of internal autonomy, but on each individual. Second, one
can observe a shift from specific qualitative properties or func-
tions attributed to the individual toward the economy of the
system that focuses on a more abstract evaluation of efficiency.
And third, the modality of disciplines is oriented towards pro-
cesses, rather than results. We can find the exact same elements of
discipline in computer architecture. Before going further, there is
an important point to make about the concealment (Verborgen-
heit) articulated as part of the enframing (Heidegger, 1981, p. 20).
When studying mainstream computer architecture literature (e.g.,
Hennessy and Patterson, 2011), transistor-level considerations
seem to be lacking. That is, the modus operandi of the actual
individual elements and how they are organized seems to require
no further explanation or justification. Rather, discussions occur
at higher levels of abstraction that obscure the individual tran-
sistor. However, when we take the term computer architecture
literally, we have to discuss the design at a brick-by-brick or
transistor-by-transistor level to understand design choices (or the
lack of them) at higher design levels.
Foucault used the image of the docile body to describe the
elementary units used to build a modern social system that
subjects these units to complete and omnipresent surveillance.
The equivalent to the docile body in computer architecture is the
transistor (Fig. 1). The transistor is a three-terminal device (it has
three connectors), and in its most common digital use it either
connects or disconnects two terminals (“drain” and “source”)
based on a control signal applied to its “gate”. It therefore acts like
a switch that is, in an idealized interpretation, either OFF or ON
(0 or 1). In this operation, the transistor is the physical device
carrying out the binary operations that form the foundation of
Boolean logic and digital computation.
However, this operational mode is the result of specific design
choices and does not fully reflect the physical nature of the tran-
sistor. The transistor is an intrinsically analog device that “knows”
more than just two terminal states. In a transition from one
terminal state to another, the transistor has to pass through the
whole spectrum of possible states that lie between 0 and 1. Although
it is an electronic device, one can picture the transition between
terminal states like a mechanical switch bound by physical laws.
Any time electrons move, they have to move through space in a
finite amount of time. The functionally non-reduced analog nature
of transistors is related to two behavioral properties that lead to a
functional reduction in favor of easier control and system-level
integration: nonlinear state transitions and device variation. Non-
linear state transitions make transistors very sensitive to small
variations in the applied control signal. If two identical transistors
receive only a marginally different control signal, they can exhibit
significantly different output states (behavior). Device variation
poses a problem of interpretation. If two transistors are indeed
controlled by the exact same signal, small variations in their phy-
sical properties can also cause these two transistors to exhibit dif-
ferent states. In both cases we are facing a problem of asserting
meaning. It becomes almost impossible to assert if different tran-
sistor outputs are intended or a result of unknown variations in
either their control or their internal properties. We could say that
this creates an epistemological problem for computation.
We have to see contemporary computer architecture as a
response to these challenges. Binary operation of transistors elim-
inates both problems at the same time. By allowing only two pos-
sible states (ON, OFF), tiny variations in transistor states do not
present interpretation problems anymore. As long as a transistor
state is somewhat close to one of two terminal states, the transistor
is interpreted as exhibiting that state. In Foucault’s terms, it was an
elimination of confusion. The success of contemporary computer
architectures relies on this homogenization of its elementary units.
The impact of heterogeneous device characteristics is eliminated by
reducing representation to only two terminal states at opposite ends
of a spectrum. When we referred to docile transistors, obviously
also for metaphorical reasons, we intended to express this func-
tional reduction of the transistor that ignores all “individuality” of
expression and only demands adherence to two predefined states of
being. The extreme functional reduction and homogenization of the
transistors permitted the construction of large-scale computer
architecture that achieves complicated functionality at higher levels.
Yet, in transistor operation, significant electrical energy is consumed
throughout the process of device switching12, the process of chan-
ging between terminal states while passing through all states in
between. To understand its implication in light of recent civiliza-
tional crises such as global warming and excessive need for fossil
fuels, how do we justify operations that require functionally reduced
individuals that consume the majority of their energy for a process
that we eliminate from meaning creation?
Closely related to the homogenization of the transistor is the
application and distribution of the clock signal, which controls all
activity. As Foucault noted, social organization saw a shift from a
qualitative evaluation of specific tasks or applications to a
quantitative evaluation of activity. Similarly, computer archi-
tecture is mostly evaluated based on quantitative measures such
as clock frequency (speed at which transistors change states) and
number of instructions (basic operations) per second. The ever
more exhaustive use of time was a main driver for performance
increases of computer architecture over the last decades. This will
lead to an absolute, ever-growing exploitation, and control of
moments of time required a centrally controlled and fully syn-
chronized computer architecture. The central clock is what gen-
erates the rhythm to which all transistors must respond.
Nowadays, computer architectures contain more than a billion
transistors. The clock signal is distributed, directly or indirectly,
to each and every one to control its activity and ensure syn-
chronization. Just like functional reduction of individual tran-
sistors, central control of time also comes at a high cost that can
be reflected on philosophically. First, the distribution of the
central clock signal requires physical infrastructure that reaches
every remote corner of the computer architecture and to which
the spatial arrangement of all other functional units is sub-
ordinated. Activity and functionality do not simply emerge; it is
preceded by a conceptualization of control. Second, the operation
of this infrastructure incurs significant energy consumption. For
some computer architectures, the clock distribution system con-
sumes >25% of total energy (Friedman, 2001). In this sense,
investments in the clock system represent the desire to control
and the assumption that without centralized control there will be
no meaningful, graduated, collective activity.
Another notion we adopted from Foucault in the previous section
was the composition of forces and the disciplinary space that creates
as many segments as there are individuals. In computer architecture,
the spatial arrangement of billions of transistors is inextricably tied to
the notions of homogenization (functional reduction) and control
Fig. 1 Transistor symbol and binary interpretation as ON/OFF switch.
The digital operation of the transistor is an example of inidividual
homogenization in favour of system integration and control.
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(clock signal). The extreme functional reduction of transistors to only
two possible states presupposes a composition of transistors into
functional units in order to perform any task of significant com-
plexity. Activity and functional heterogeneity, therefore, are the result
of specific spatial and temporal arrangements of a set of inter-
connected homogenized transistors. The structure given to a set of
transistors determines their individual activity and collective func-
tionality. Clearly defined spatial structures and functional roles of
transistors permit the precise enforcement of the clock rhythm. The
combination of fully known spatial arrangements and the distribu-
tion of the clock signal they facilitate, then creates a system for which
we can determine the state of each of the more than a billion tran-
sistors at every nanosecond of operation (see Jonas and Kording
(2017) for an interesting transistor-level analysis of computer archi-
tecture). While such a computer architecture allows anything that can
be expressed algorithmically to be computed, the spatial (and
therefore functional) fragmentation of computation is one of its main
limitations in terms of efficiency and its evolution. Spatial fragmen-
tation leads to an architecture where we have clearly separated
functional units such as the control unit, the memory, and the
arithmetic logic unit. However, any computation requires all of these
units to interact, which is resolved by internal communication
infrastructure. The price to pay for the functional fragmentation is a
high need for communication (mobility) of data and instructions.
The “von Neumann bottleneck” describes how the functioning of
computer architecture is limited by its data transfer capabilities. To
better relate to the problem, we can draw a parallel to global capit-
alism, which exhibits a similar spatial fragmentation of production
integrated in a single system through constant mobility of people
and goods.
It should now be clear what we could call the political anatomy of
computer architecture. Exercising the disciplines over large quan-
tities of homogenized and functionally reduced transistors to form a
single integrated system would not have been possible without a
political anatomy. Political anatomy is the set of structural
arrangements and methods that on the one hand divide individuals
and processes, but at the same time ensure the direction of all
activities toward a common objective. The modular design of
computer architectures, with distinct functional units (at design
levels higher than the transistor level), then implements a political
anatomy that controls the flow of data and operations throughout
the system. The word political therefore refers to the command
structures embedded in the functioning of computer architectures
that subject individual and docile transistors to system objectives. In
contrast, recent developments in computer architecture design
provide examples for reflection upon alternative (political) princi-
ples guiding the integration and interaction of millions and billions
of transistors. Neural computer architectures such as Neurogrid
(Benjamin et al., 2014) and Loihi (Davies et al., 2018) are highly
distributed information processing units that tolerate and even
benefit from heterogeneity across homogeneous individuals (neu-
rons). Yet, they are not general purpose architectures and further
scaling of neural computers still faces technical challenges in their
physical realization. Nonetheless, with the structure given to often
millions of neurons they represent another form of organization.
Asynchronous computer architectures do away with the global
clock signal that governs and constraints all activity on a computer
chip and move toward local organization of computing (Sutherland
and Ebergen, 2002). In his article “The tyranny of the clock”,
Sutherland (2012) provides technical motivations for a paradigm
shift in computer design, but also points to the required social
paradigm shift in design and education allowing students to think
differently about (computer) system organization and for asyn-
chronous computer architectures (as a paradigm free of a single
global control signal) to self-perpetuate. A third trend to mention is
the shift from homogeneous to heterogeneous computer
architectures (HCA) (Augonnet et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2006).
Rather than a single form of organization and control for the whole
system and its operations, HCA exploit different subsystems that
are tailored to specific tasks, mostly through imposition of different
structures onto the individual transistors within the subsystems.
While heterogeneity is leading to more efficient computers, chal-
lenges of translations and interpretations between subsystems arise.
Large-scale systems composed of homogeneous individuals
By giving a computer architecture interpretation of Foucault’s
writing and a short philosophical reflection on the design principles
of contemporary computer architecture, we expect to have earned
skepticism of computer engineers and philosophers alike. It is
therefore time to generalize the analogies we have created. In sec-
tion “Foucault and computer architecture”, we reinterpreted Fou-
cault’s original text through minimal changes in vocabulary and
argued that it is, while certainly unconventional, a meaningful
description of computer architecture. This was contextualized in
section three by discussing some of the direct technical ramifica-
tions and some preliminary philosophical implications of computer
architecture design choices. It should come as no surprise that what
we are developing here is a comparison of social organization (or
social architecture) and computer architecture. Although we are
talking about two very different systems and types of individuals,
humans and transistors, we find that both are exposed to the dis-
ciplines and political anatomy.
That technological artifacts in general, or the computer in
particular, can embody or exercise forms of politics is by no
means a new proposition. As was mentioned before, Winner
(1980) demonstrated how politics are imposed through the design
of a bridge, as well as the factory. Pinch and Bijker (1984) used
the bicycle to show how technological design, in combination
with social norms, can reinforce the dominance of already
dominant groups within society. ActorNetwork Theory holds that,
among others, social relations as well as technologies are social
constructs and results of interacting and mutually dependent
actants (human and non-human) (Latour, 1999, 2005). Feenberg
(2008), with the concept of the technical code, expressed how a
technical solution is the result of filtering through alternative
technical possibilities as to meet certain social or ideological
requirements. Moreover, Akrich (1997, p. 208) established the
notion of the script embedded in technological artifacts that
represents “specific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations,
political prejudices, and the rest” of the designer. These seminal
contributions to our sociological and philosophical understanding
of technology have pointed out how technology establishes,
reinforces, and intensifies power dynamics within social groups
through the interaction of humans with a technological artifact or
the mediation of human relations through technology. This paper
explores something different: not a socio-technical system or
artifact, but the conception of a purely technical one; one that
does not involve human interaction in its internal operations.
This is to say that we are adopting, may be even extending, the
concept of politics (understood as power relations) to define the
internal organization and operation between strictly technical
elements. Arguing that we have two systems, one social, one
technical, that exhibit significant organizational similarities,
identified through the political principles they embody, then begs
the question of their relation. On the one hand, we have a modern
technological artifact that behaves entirely deterministically and is
composed of devices that exhibit, arguably, a less complex set of
behaviors than humans. On the other hand, we have technology
as method embedded in numerous mechanisms of control in a
social system with many non-deterministic dynamics and whose
organization and evolution cannot be justified by purely technical
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considerations. What could be the basis for any meaningful
comparison of such two systems?
To develop a response to this question, we will incorporate
ideas from Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida. First, it can be
argued that the close resemblance of computer architecture and
Foucault’s writing is by no means a coincidence. Foucault himself
provides ample support for certain organizational principles of
Panopticism being replicated in the military, schools, hospitals,
etc. While it might present a larger conceptual shift to consider
these principles in a purely technological artifact, we find it
plausible to assume that the organization of many individuals to
form a single functioning system might be the defining factor for
these principles. This can be supported by understanding that
Foucault’s discussions have focused on social systems undergoing
rapid growth. Secondly, to develop a position regarding the
design principles mentioned above, we adopt Heidegger’s notion
of the enframing (Heidegger, 1981, p. 20). In our reading of
Heidegger, the enframing is something that imposes boundaries
on the possibilities of a thing to become. We could say it is an
ideological framework that makes us accept established notions
while at the same time making us blind to alternatives. More
concretely, this could imply that the design of computer archi-
tecture and principles of social systems share the same essence.
This would be an argument supporting our adaptation of Fou-
cault. The implication, in a Heideggarian sense, is the existence of
a more primal truth (Heidegger, 1981, p. 28). This primal truth
can then refer to either a rethinking of computation or even a
rethinking of social organization. We therefore argue that we are
observing two systems defined by a common enframing and that
the revealing of the enframing can have direct implications for
our understanding of technical, as well as social organization.
And thirdly, we should then ask what this primal truth is? Can we
go beyond just referring to this metaphysical concept? For this we
turn to Derrida and his work on modern democracy (Derrida,
2005). Democracy (or, more accurately, representative democ-
racy) is at least in part, similar to Foucault’s arguments: an
organizational form that is a response to growing population
sizes. It therefore can be understood within the notion of inte-
grating many individuals in a single system. Derrida’s critique of
contemporary western democracies is that they represent a
minimal democracy. In other words, democratic processes are for
the most part reduced to casting votes every couple of years. This
resembles the functional reduction of the individual for the sake
of system-level objectives. Derrida develops the concept of the
democracy to come (Derrida, 2005, p. 8). This is a democracy that
represents a social system without subjecting individuals to
contemporary levels of homogenization and functional reduction.
Rather, as Derrida argues, this democracy would be hetero-
geneous, yet inseparable (Derrida, 2005, p. 88); exhibit dynamic
divisions of sovereignty (Derrida, 2005, p. 87); and degenerate
violence, authority and the power of law (Derrida, 2002b, p. 281).
The democracy to come relies “on the condition of thinking life
otherwise, life and the force of life.” We argue that this condition
also expresses the idea of revealing the enframing to arrive at a
more primal truth, or may be we should say alternative truth.
We compile and depict all these ideas in Fig. 2. We have to
understand some social and technical organizing principles using a
more abstract notion of Large-Scale Systems Composed of Homo-
geneous Individuals (LSSCHI). The first aspect of this notion is the
fact that it is large-scale. Obviously, all systems, no matter their size,
subject their individuals to some forms of homogenization (i.e.,
shared language, rituals, roles, responsibilities, etc.). However, what
is important is the relation between the individual and the system.
In large-scale systems with millions of individuals, the relative
importance of any individual becomes marginalized and subjected
to system objectives. This is qualitatively different from small sys-
tems that exhibit a much greater interdependence between the
system and any given individual. The second aspect of the notion is
that of homogeneous individuals (a system composed of the same
type of individuals; while a necessary condition, this is not
equivalent to homogenized individuals). We can clearly point to
large-scale systems composed of heterogeneous individuals (or
components), such as airplanes and factories that are composed of
millions of individual parts. However, heterogeneity of individuals
does not permit the arbitrary replacement of one individual with
another without compromising the functionality of the system.
While heterogeneous components have their functionality, and
through that their place in the system inscribed in them, the uni-
versality of homogeneous individuals requires politics for the
articulation of activities and functions within the system. Here, we
have discussed two possible manifestations of such systems—one
technical and one social. Drawing on Heidegger, we argued that the
similarity between these two systems is a result of a shared
enframing rather than a coincidence. Both systems we discussed
therefore represent manifestations of the same mode of system
organization (for completeness we also consider natural systems
such as ant colonies or bee hives as possible manifestations of
LSSCHI, though for the sake of maintaining our focus we will not
discuss them here). If we see it as our responsibility to question the
status quo, to not accept it as the best we can get, but to seek
alternative social organizations, we can then adopt Heidegger’s idea
of a more primal truth, or Derrida’s notion of a democracy to come.
Fig. 2 Large-scale systems composed of homogeneous individuals. LSSCHI posits that the recognition of different systems as manifestations of the same
mode of organziation can help reveal the corresponding enframing and motivate reflections on alternative modes of organization.
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With respect to our more abstract interpretation of social and
technical systems, we rephrase Derrida by proclaiming the possible
existence of organizations to come. Organizations to come, under-
standing social and technical organization as being determined by
principles relating to the integration of large numbers of homo-
geneous individuals into a functioning system, then have implica-
tions for social, as well as technical systems. Moreover, we could
imagine that any revealing in one specific manifestation can find
analogies in another manifestation, leading to a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the systems in which we are so deeply
embedded that we often cannot even grasp them.
In the most general sense, our proposal regarding LSSCHI is a
framework allowing for new perspectives on the relations between
individuals, structure, activity, and power within large-scale sys-
tems. As we argued, individuals are functionally reduced and
embedded in a structure to recreate complex functionality at the
system level. Their particular interrelations then constitute the
power relations between individuals themselves and between indi-
viduals and the system. We have seen that the modern organiza-
tions of computer architecture and societies rely strongly on similar
forms of homogenization and control. However, should we accept
modern organization with its levels of homogenization and control
as necessary, or should we seek to reveal its enframing in an effort to
arrive at organizations to come? For Derrida, democracy to come was
an elusive idea, not one we can clearly point to. As he said, “it is not
the democracy of the future, but a democracy that must have the
structure of a promise—and thus the memory of that which carries
the future, the to-come, here and now” (Derrida, 2005, p. 85). What
is interesting about this statement is the reference to a structure of a
promise. What does Derrida mean by this reference? Maybe, and
using a subsequent reference of his, it is the idea of “the condition of
thinking life otherwise, life and the force of life” (Derrida, 2005, p.
33). In our abstract LSSCHI context, we understand life as analo-
gous to the individual and the force of life as resembling activities
that individuals perform. Life then poses the question of indivi-
duality, plurality, and to some extent the refusal of system objec-
tives. Activity, as the force of life, poses a contradictory demand (we
could say life and the force of life constitute an auto-immune
process (Derrida, 2002a, p. 78)). Activity is what sustains life,
individual and communal. It is an articulation of shared interests
across individuals and in this sense a homogenizing force, one that
sets limits to individuality. Coming back to the structure of a pro-
mise, the structure imposed upon individuals is then what deter-
mines the promises of life (individual) and activity (force of life).
Organizations to come, for any LSSCHI, will therefore be char-
acterizable by their relations of individuals, structure, and activity.
As at the beginning of this paragraph, we have to add the notion of
power to this relation. While a core principle in Foucault, power is
also at the heart of Derrida’s understanding of the democracy to
come. When he talks about societies that are “heterogeneous, but
inseparable” (Derrida, 2005, p. 88), dynamic “divisions of sover-
eignty” (Derrida, 2005, p. 87), or the “degeneration of law, the
violence, the authority and the power of law” (Derrida, 2002b, p.
281) he sets clear examples of the centrality of power. We argue that
the democracy to come remains rather elusive as our ideas for viable
power relations are limited when we think of heterogeneity and
reduction of control in large-scale systems. This challenge translates
directly to the more abstract concept of organizations to come.
Some final remarks
When individuals become so homogenized that dissent is
impossible, we have created a machine, as the example of com-
puter architecture shows. After 1840, when Comte was spreading
his Religion of Humanity, his printed works included an epigraph
with the positivist motto: “Love as a principle and order as the
basis; progress as the goal” (Angenot, 2006, p. 67). When the
American Revolution and, especially, the French Revolution
shaped modern thought and transformed the way we understand
politics, Comte’s ideas became profoundly influential for many
nation states founded after the nineteenth century, like the Latin
American countries. An unquestionable manifestation of this
influence is the inscription of “Order and Progress” in the curved
banner on the Brazilian national flag. With order as the basis, i.e.,
when a specific anatomy is imposed, the proclaimed principle of
love can only be legitimate if the subject of that love respects the
singular order. It is of course correct to assert that homogeneity is
not a necessary condition for order, but the examples given above
are strong indicators that modern thought equates order with
homogeneity. Order then implies the prohibition of disorder,
dissent, or questioning of structures. Moreover, progress is a
singular and univocal notion, since the goal excludes all other
possibilities for human development. This vague notion of pro-
gress, in the context of order, undoubtedly refers to progress
toward society as a machinery. It transmits a utilitarian vision of
improving the human condition. It is emblematic of the
enframing of modern organization and is an expression of how
we seek for homogeneity, despite all claims to the contrary.
Since Plato, the main problem political theory deals with is
resolving conflicts within a community or society. In the modern
and liberal tradition, politics is merely a functional process of
problem-solving or achieving objectives. This rather utilitarian
approach to politics is the basis for the numeric and managerial
understanding of democracy (Derrida, 2005, pp. 29–30) that denies
any politics not based in the quantification of the individual. That is
to say, the political phenomenon is limited to sanctioned activities
within the bounds of formal institutions, like governments, nation
states, or supranational organizations (i.e., European Union). These
organizations are frequently highly structured, large-scale social
systems, defining and holding sovereignty over large numbers of
individuals. To be a legitimate individual within such social systems
requires embracing homogeneity according to predefined roles and
mechanisms. Any perturbation of the order by individuals results in
a defense mechanism of the system that tries to delimit, isolate, or
even eliminate the abnormality. Our Western democracies, that
legitimize themselves through the unconditional defense of human
rights, are constantly breaking this very principle for the sake of
self-preservation and a utilitarian vision of order and progress. As
Derrida pointed out: “Democracy is suicidal” (Derrida, 2005, p. 33).
When modern democratic systems perceive something as a threat,
they exhibit auto-immune reactions. They increase control and
surveillance over individuals, a reinforcement and assertion of
homogeneity, to single out the non-conforming, the abnormal, the
dangerous. Modern democracy, therefore, respects individuals who
are a recognized part of the system. It defends the ones who have
the same “origin,” the same genesis, the ones who have a document
that can identify them as compliant and homogenized. However,
the foreigner, the strange, the undocumented, represents a threat.
War on terror, immigration crisis, hate crimes, among other
profound problems we are facing, are symptoms of the inability
or our democratic institutions to uphold their own principles
when it comes to individuals that challenge the established
structures or even our singular idea of progress. However, we
should not ignore the fact that the dysfunctional or dangerous
individual, the antigen, historically has also been the engine of
social change. A high concentration of antigens can radically
transform or end a system. When “sick” bodies, the undocile
bodies, gain considerable strength, they force the large-scale
system to reorganize, to change its own laws, to keep from
perishing. Social transformation is always related to hetero-
geneity. A defense of plurality is a claim, a manifesto of the
dynamism of social systems, the validity and the possibility for
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movement and dissent; it is an affirmation of life. It is therefore
in our utmost interest to challenge the modern mode of orga-
nization and move towards organizations to come that are
characterized by structures that affirm plurality, not just in
terms of system-level functionality, but for individuals and
activity, as life and the force of life.
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Notes
1 Computer architecture describes the specific spatial and functional arrangements that
integrate billions of individual devices into a single microprocessor (computer chip).
2 A transistor is the basic element used to build a microcontroller. It is equivalent to
Foucault’s “body”.
3 We replaced “movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity” with similar transistor-related
concepts. Activity is the act of moving from one state to another. A stable state is a
representation of a transistors value and its meaning in reference to the system.
Energy is the cost it takes to move between states. Frequency defines the speed at
which a transistor can change states.
4 We adopt Foucault’s notion of supervision as control as a more common concept in
computer architecture.
5 A docile transistor is obviously a figure of speech to construct a certain imagination.
Docility, here, does not mean that the transistor was once willful, but expresses the
elimination of possible alternative behaviors.
6 The original text states “in political terms of obedience”. Reduced variation expresses
the same idea as it reduces the risk of individual transistors disrupting the system.
7 We reinterpret “tactics” as design, which is what defines control in computer
architecture.
8 The original text “by walking up and down the central aisle of the workshop” implies
a constantly returning control and enforcement of work. In computer architecture
such rhythmic control of activity is enforced through a clock signal that reaches each
individual transistor across the entire computer architecture.
9 We reinterpret the “mechanical” terms of labor process and production as the
“digital” term of processing.
10 The objective of the spatial and temporal fragmentation of processing raw data is to
create information, which is the “profit” computation generates.
11 Here, we reinterpret “the time of each” as the cycle of each to stress the repetitive and
synchronizing force of the central clock signal that controls all transistors.
12 Total power consumption is the sum of static and dynamic power consumption.
Static power is consumed when the transistor is in a terminal state and it increased
proportionally as device sizes shrank. Dynamic power is consumed during the
switching between terminal states.
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